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Abstract.  A glaring hole exists between academic marketing literature and anecdotal observations on the effect of 
interpersonal ties for interfirm exchange. Academic marketing literature, economic perspective in particular, either frowns on 
or belittles the impact of interpersonal ties for interfirm exchange. In contrast, we often hear street-smart people say that it is 
“who you know, not what you know,” that counts for the success in business.   This study aims to clarify the role of 
interpersonal ties in interfirm exchange by examining the effect of interpersonal dependence on interfirm-level issues in 
industrial distributor – supplier relationships. Specifically, we propose that interpersonal dependence has differential effects 
on the elements  of interfirm relationships (distributor dependence, trust, and  commitment) and that, in return, these 
exchange elements have differential effects on the efficiency of interfirm exchange. The proposed hypotheses were tested 
with data collected through a survey of industrial distributors in the United States and Japan.  The hypotheses on the effects 
of interpersonal dependence on interfirm relational elements received a mixed support, while the hypotheses on the effects of 
interfirm relational elements on the efficiency of exchange received support.    
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If Japanese want to get the things done, they must make a 
day-to-day efforts to establish  firm human relationships 
(Yoshimura and Anderson 1996, p. 54). 
 
Distribution channel relationships have undergone 
remarkable changes in the last decade. One of the most 
important changes is the shift of channel goals from 
maximizing profits from discrete transactions to building 
and managing interfirm relationships which enhance long-
term competitive advantage (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). Two fundamental 
differences exist between discrete transactions and long-
term, close exchange relationships: the temporal element 
of the exchange and the identity of the exchange parties 
(Gerlach 1992).  Whereas each discrete transaction occurs 
as an independent exchange episode, long-term exchange 
relationships develop over extended period of time.   
Accordingly, recent studies have examined how past 
history (Gulati 1995; Weiss and Kurland 1997) and future 
prospect (Heide and Miner 1992; Ganesan 1994) of the 
relationship influence present interactions between the 
exchange parties.  
 
The second difference is concerned with the identity 
of the people involved in the exchange.  Whereas the 
issue of identity is immaterial in discrete transactions 
because each transaction occurs between “faceless” 
exchange parties (Butler 1983), it becomes an important 
consideration because a series of exchanges occur 
between the same parties over an extended period of time. 
The relationship between supplier sales personnel and 
distributor purchasing manager (or representative) in 
industrial market is a classic example of personal 
relationships overlapping with formal interfirm 
relationships (Bradach and Eccles 1989, p. 109). 
Surprisingly, very little research on the role of the identity 
of the exchange personnel for interfirm relationships has 
been reported in the marketing channels literature except 
for conceptual recognition for the importance of personal 
ties for interfirm exchange (Gundlach and Achrol 1993; 
Weitz and Jap 1995).  
 
Consider extant marketing channels literature on 
close interfirm relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Anderson and Weitz 1992; Gundlach, Achrol, and 
Mentzer 1995; Lusch and Brown 1996; Morgan and Hunt 
1994).  None of these empirical studies examined 
interpersonal factors as an antecedent of close interfirm 
relationships as are represented by high trust and 
commitment (see Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1995 and 
Murry and Heide 1998 for notable exceptions).  Consider 
another major research stream in marketing channels 
literature, interfirm power-dependence (Geyskens et al. 
1996; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995, 1998).   
Despite its long and rich tradition in marketing channels 
literature since early 1970’s (see Frazier 1999 for a 
review), few previous studies have examined how 
dependence at the interpersonal level relates to 
dependence at the interfirm level (cf. Frazier 1983).  This 
reticence on the role of interpersonal factors for interfirm 
relationships in marketing channels literature contrasts 
sharply with anecdotal observations by practitioners (“It 
is who you know, not what you know, that makes or 
breaks the deal”) and management research (Larson 1992; 
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998).  This glaring gap 
between academic literature and realistic observations 
needs to be filled.     
 
Ignoring the issue of interpersonal factors will 






marketing channel management. From a theoretical 
standpoint, our knowledge base on interfirm relationship 
is likely to remain incomplete until we verify empirically 
the potential role of interpersonal factors for interfirm 
exchange relationships (Heide 1994).  On the practice 
side, it will be infeasible to develop and manage a 
successful channel relationship until a channel manager 
has clear grasp on the role of interpersonal factors.  In 
particular, interpersonal factors has been said to be crucial 
in managing distribution channel relationships in non-
U.S. channel contexts such as Japan and China where 
interpersonal ties are said to play a key role in business 
transactions (Cateora and Graham 1998; Lincoln and 
Kalleberg 1990; Lovett, Simmons, and Kali 1999).  Yet, 
little empirical verification and support have been 
reported. Despite the abundance of discussion on the 
importance of interpersonal factors in foreign markets and 
call for more research on foreign marketing channels, our 
knowledge on the foreign marketing channel 
relationships, the role of interpersonal ties in particular, is 
scant at best. 
 
The study reported here aims to fill that gap by 
examining the impact of an interpersonal factor – personal 
dependence – on interfirm relationships and a subsequent 
efficiency of interfirm exchange.  Specifically, we first 
examine how personal dependence between a distributor  
and its supplier contact person affects two major groups 
of marketing channel constructs: (a) distributor firm –
level dependence and (b) trustworthiness of the supplier 
and distributor commitment.   In particular, we pay 
special attention to differential effects of personal 
dependence on domestic channel relationships vis-à-vis 
Japanese channel relationships.  Then, we examine how a 
distributor firm’s interfirm relational factors (trust and 
commitment) affect economic efficiency of interfirm 
exchange (coordination cost savings).  
 
The intended contribution of this study is twofold. 
First, the study intends to fill the gap between the 
academic marketing literature and realistic observations 
by verifying the potential role of interpersonal factors for  
interfirm relationships. Relatedly, the study intends to 
expand the scope of distribution channels literature on 
interfirm relationships by examining the cross-national 
convergence and divergence on the role of personal 
dependence. We conduct an empirical study in domestic 
channel relationships and Japanese channel relationships 
in an effort to solve this problem.
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Secondly, the study intends to enhance understanding 
on the effect of  relational exchange as represented by  
distributor trust and commitment on the efficiency of 
exchange.  Although it has been suggested that “the 
presence of relationship commitment and trust is central 
to successful relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt 
1994, p. 22), empirical evidence on the contribution of  
trust and commitment on the efficiency of exchange 
remains scarce. In this study, we examine the effects of 
trust and commitment on coordination cost.  We would 
like to verify whether trust and commitment have 
significant and identical effects on the efficiency of 
exchange through this effect.  
 
The study begins with a review of the extant 
literature on the role of personal ties in interfirm 
relationships, followed by the hypotheses that describe the 
links between a distributor’s interpersonal dependence, 
interfirm relational factors, and efficiency of exchange.  
The method section begins with measure development, 
followed by description of data collection, measure 
validation, and statistical analysis. In the discussion 
section, the major findings are reviewed from theoretical 
and managerial perspectives, the limitation of the study 




Two Perspectives on the Role of  Interpersonal Factors 
on Interfirm Relationships 
 
Economic perspective. Neoclassical economic 
approach of interfirm exchange assumes that interfirm 
exchange behavior is affected minimally by social or 
personal relations (Hirschman 1982). Economic behavior 
is regarded as autonomous from social relationships and 
no impact of social structure and social relations is 
suggested.  Therefore,  the identity and past relations with 
individual exchange personnel are considered as 
irrelevant.   If personal relations are ever developed 
between exchange parties at all, they are treated as a 
“frictional drag” that impedes competitive and fair 
transactions between the exchange parties (Granovetter 
1985).  
 
Theories under the umbrella of new institutional 
economics do consider personal factors in interfirm 
exchange. But, both transaction cost analysis and agency 
theory assume that people involved in a relationship are 
motivated by economic self-interest and will engage in 
opportunistic behavior (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker, Jr 
1992). For example, agency theory considers the 
development of close ties with an agent (supplier’s sales 
rep) and customer (distributor purchasing rep) as a 
potential threat to the interests of the principal  (supplier 
firm) (Mills 1990). Indeed, firms did take steps to address 
these potential agency problems. It has been said that 
General Motors one time rotated their field sales rep 
every six months because of the fear that its sales rep 
develops close relationships with dealers and put the 
dealers’ interest over the interests of General Motors. 
Consequently, research focus has been devoted to dealing 
with the potentially adverse consequences of agency 






Sociological perspective. In contrast to the economic 
perspective, sociologists and anthropologists long argued 
that economic behavior occurs under the influence of 
social relations.  Yet, socialized conception of how social 
structure or relations affect individual behavior are rather 
mechanical: once an individual’s social class or relations 
is known, everything else in behavior is automatic and 
predictable, since they are so well socialized. Therefore, 
exchange parties are said to be undersocialized when 
portrayed as isolated, rational economic units and 
oversocialized when portrayed as governed exclusively by 
social values and norms (Granovetter 1985).
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Following the lead by Granovetter (1985, p. 487), we 
maintain that exchange parties do not behave or decide as 
atoms  outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script imposed by the particular social 
categories that they occupy. Instead, the economic 
exchange between firms  are embedded on concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations.  
 
Embeddedness  as a nexus between economic 
perspective and sociological perspective 
We refer to a channel context in which interpersonal 
relations alter interfirm exchange as “embedded.” In an 
embedded market, personal ties between buyer personnel 
and seller personnel bear on interfirm exchange. Unlike 
economic perspective or sociological perspective, the 
embeddedness approach to interfirm exchange threads its 
way between the oversocialized approach of general 
morality and the undersocialized one of impersonal, 
institutional arrangements by following and analyzing 
concrete patterns of social relations (Granovetter 1985). 
Therefore, it is the details of interpersonal ties that will 
affect what is found in the interfirm relationship. The 
concept of embeddedness has been explicitly used as a 
paradigm for industrial buyer behavior (Bonoma, 
Bagozzi, and Zaltman 1978) and has implicitly appeared 
as a contextual factor affecting channel dyads (Reve and 
Stern 1986) and salesman-customer dyads (Weitz 1981). 
 
In distribution channel relationships, embeddedness 
is likely to manifest in the following fashion: Under the 
channel context where the interfirm relationship are not 
embedded in interpersonal relations, personal ties are 
unlikely to have any significant impact on interfirm 
relational issues. Operationally,  personal-level 
dependence at  a distributor firm is unlikely to be related 
to its firm-level dependence, trustworthiness of the 
supplier firm, and distributor commitment. In contrast, 
under the channel context where the interfirm relationship 
is embedded in interpersonal relations, personal ties are 
likely to have significant impact on interfirm 
relationships. Operationally, personal-level  dependence 
at a distributor firm is likely to be related positively to 
firm-level dependence,  trustworthiness of the supplier 
firm, and distributor commitment.  
  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The conceptual framework consists of  two building 
blocks: One block in which the links among the variables 
are invariance across different national settings, which we 
would call “context-excluded” relationships (Cheng 
1994). In the other building block, the links among the 
variables are variant across different national settings, 
which  we would call “context-embedded” relationships.  
We hypothesize the link between interfirm relationships 
and efficiency of exchange as “context-excluded” 
relationships and the link between  personal dependence 
and interfirm relationships as “context-embedded” 
relationships.  The conceptual framework is described on 






























Interpersonal Dependence and Efficiency of Interfirm Exchange
 
 
Interfirm Relationships and Efficiency of Exchange: 
Cross-national Invariance 
 
Trustworthiness of supplier and coordination cost. 
Among different elements of efficiency, we focus on 
coordination cost. Coordination cost is defined as the cost 
involved in communicating with the focal supplier, 
resolving differences, and reaching agreement with the 
supplier (Stewart 1995). When trustworthiness of the 
supplier is low because of either lack of experience or 
negative experience with the supplier, coordination of 
distribution operations with the supplier is likely to be 
costly for the following reasons. The distributor should 
pay close attention to minute details of negotiation with 
the supplier because the distributor is not certain about the 
supplier’s good intentions and incentives. There is fear 
that the supplier may renege on its responsibilities unless 
they are spelled out and agreed on. The distributor is 
likely to make every effort to maximize its interest for 
each round of negotiation with the supplier because the 
distributor assumes that the supplier is interested in 
maximizing its own interest. 
In contrast, coordination cost is likely to drop 
significantly as trustworthiness of the supplier increases. 
The distributor does not have to spend excessive time and 
energy in negotiating and resolving differences on the 
minute details of operation with the supplier because there 
is belief that the supplier will conduct its business in 
honest and sincere way. The distributor does not have to 
haggle with the supplier to maximize its interest from 
each round of negotiation because there is belief that the 
supplier is genuinely interested in securing the benefits of 
the distributor as well as its own.        
 
 
H1:  Trustworthiness of the supplier firm is associated 
negatively with distributor coordination cost. 
Distributor commitment and coordination cost. 
Despite the ostensibly positive effect of commitment on 
channel performance, it is still unknown how commitment 
affects cost of coordinating channel operations.  We 
maintain that a distributor’s commitment to the 
relationship increases coordination cost from a 
distributor’s point of view. That is, a distributor’s own 
commitment is related positively to coordination cost. 
First, as a distributor’s desire to continue and further 
develop the relationship increases, the distributor is likely 
to be more receptive to the supplier’s specific policies and 
accommodative to the supplier’s requests. In other words, 
the distributor will be willing to take more burden and 
expend its resources in aligning its operations with those 
of the supplier, which will increase coordination cost.   
Second, a committed distributor is also likely to initiate 
more communication with the supplier (Morgan and Hunt 
1994). In addition, the distributor will make serious effort 
to resolve disagreements or conflicts with the supplier in 
an amicable and constructive way (Mohr and Nevin 
1990). The time and energy spent by the distributor in this 
process is likely to increase significantly as the distributor 
engages in communications to resolve the differences in a 
functional and constructive way.            
 
H2: Distributor commitment  is associated positively 
with distributor coordination cost. 
 
Trustworthiness of supplier and distributor 
commitment. Distributor commitment is likely to increase 
as the trustworthiness of the supplier firm increases for IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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the following reasons. First, when a distributor finds that 
the supplier is honest and fair in dealings with the 
distributor, the distributor   believes that the supplier firm 
will not take unexpected actions that would result in 
negative outcomes for the distributor. Since commitment 
by definition entails vulnerability to the committed party 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994), a distributor’s confidence in the 
supplier’s trustworthiness will reduce the distributor’s 
perceived uncertainty and enhance its desire to continue 
the relationship with the supplier. In addition, if a 
distributor perceives that the supplier is sincere in 
dealings with the distributor and generous and 
accommodative in interactions with the distributor,  the 
distributor will believe that the supplier is interested in 
gaining not only its own benefit but also the distributor’s 
benefit (Larson 1992), which will facilitate the 
distributor’s motivation to further develop the 
relationship.  
 
H3: Trustworthiness of the supplier firm is related 
positively to distributor commitment. 
 
Distributor dependence and distributor commitment. 
High distributor dependence means that it is difficult for 
the distributor firm to replace the incumbent supplier with 
alternative suppliers for various reasons (Heide and John 
1988; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995), including 
supplier’s sales and profit contribution (El-Ansary and 
Stern 1972) and  supplier’s superior performance of 
channel functions (Frazier 1983).  As the extent of 
reliance on the supplier increases, the distributor’s desire 
to continue and further develop the relationship with the 
incumbent increases. It is also possible that distributor 
dependence is high simply because there are simply no or 
few other alternative suppliers. Under this situation, the 
distributor has no choice but to maintain the relationship 
with the incumbent supplier. When there is no other 
alternative supplier, the distributor motivation to maintain 
the relationship also increases and the distributor may 
send a signal of commitment by making short-term 
sacrifices and providing special help to the supplier 
because of its need to show goodwill to the supplier 
(Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson 1995).  The positive effect 
of dependence on commitment has been supported by 
previous studies at both interpersonal (Jemmott, Ashby, 
and Lindenfeld 1989; Johnson and Rusbult 1989) and 
interfirm levels (Levinthal and Fichman 1988).  
 
H4a: Distributor firm-level dependence is associated 
positively with distributor commitment.  
 
While most previous studies examined a firm’s own 
dependence and its commitment to the relationship with a 
supplier, the link between a firm’s dependence and its 
partner firm’s commitment has not been elucidated. We 
maintain that, other things being equal, supplier 
dependence has a positive effect on distributor 
commitment for the following reasons. First, under a 
certain level of distributor dependence, increasing levels 
of supplier dependence lead to higher total 
interdependence between a supplier and its distributor, 
which is found to have a positive effect on distributor 
commitment (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). 
Second, other things being equal, a distributor is likely to 
be committed more to the relationship with a  supplier 
that is dependent on the distributor  rather than to the 
relationship with a supplier whose dependence is low 
(Kim 1999). A supplier that is highly dependent on the 
distributor will be more cooperative and adaptive to the 
distributor request and express desire to maintain the 
relationship.  In return, a distributor is likely to be more 
committed to  a supplier that is interested in maintaining 
and developing the relationship into the future than to a 
supplier whose dependence is low.    
 
H4b: Other things being equal, a supplier’s firm-level 
dependence is associated positively with distributor 
commitment. 
 
Interpersonal Dependence and Interfirm 
Relationships: Cross-national variance  
 
Two conflicting views have been suggested in the 
literature on the effect of personal-level dependence on 
interfirm relationships.   Economic perspectives suggest 
that personal-level dependence will have negative impact 
of efficient exchange.  The dependent person (distributor 
personnel) is vulnerable to opportunism or shirking by the 
exchange partner (supplier personnel).  In other words, 
people’s incentive to perform may diminish as personal 
dependence increases (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 1994; 
Williamson 1996).  On the other hand, management 
literature highlights the positive aspects of personal 
dependence for interfirm exchange.   Research on 
boundary-spanning behavior suggests that close ties 
between boundary personnel should have a positive effect 
on interfirm exchange (Adams 1976; Salancik 1977). In 
particular, Frazier (1983) examined role performance of 
automobile manufacturers’ boundary personnel and found 
that it is related strongly to dealer satisfaction, 
manufacturer’s interest of dealer’s welfare (as perceived 
by dealer), and agreement on decision strategy variables.  
In addition, research on “embeddedness” (Granovetter 
1985) and “social context” (Gulati 1995; Hakansson and 
Snehota 1995) attests to the positive effect of personal 
dependence for interfirm exchange. 
 
We maintain that distributor firm personnel’s 
dependence on the supplier firm contact person has a 
positive effect on the distributor firm’s relationship with 
its supplier firm for two reasons. First,  the context of 
most previous studies using transaction cost analysis was 
a manufacturer’s concern for dealing with its supplier 
(Heide and John 1990; Stump and Heide 1996) or IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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distributor (Anderson 1988; Weiss and Anderson 1992).  
Under this context, a manufacturer boundary personnel’s 
dependence on either supplier personnel or distributor 
personnel may very well cause concern for being 
vulnerable to potential opportunism. However, personal 
dependence takes on a different meaning from a 
distributor’s point of view.  Dependence on supplier 
boundary personnel is essential source of a distributor’s 
successful business operations. It is really the boundary 
personnel of a supplier firm who translate strategic 
concepts and  operational policies of the supplier firm into 
action and carry them forward.  Supplier boundary 
personnel can make a difference in dealer business by 
coordinating the operations of supplier and distributor and 
cooperating with the distributor on matters of concern 
(Frazier 1983).      
 
Secondly, distributor’s personal dependence takes on 
an even more importance in industrial distribution 
channel where the distributor carries multiple product 
lines and often competing brands under a product line 
(Frazier and Rody 1991).  Since distributors are 
constrained in the amount of time they can devote to any 
one supplier, suppliers will vie for the distributor’s time 
and attention. Under this condition, superior role 
performance of the supplier boundary spanning personnel 
and distributor’s subsequent dependence on that person 
will be critical for obtaining distributor’s time and 
attention.  Therefore, we hypothesize that 
 
H5: A distributor’s personal-level dependence is 
associated positively with (a) trustworthiness of the 
supplier firm, (b) distributor commitment, and (c) 
distributor firm-level dependence. 
 
The case of Japanese industrial distribution 
channels. Like the case of the United States, we suggest 
that interpersonal dependence is associated positively to 
interfirm relationships. We further suggest that the 
strength of the links between interpersonal ties and 
interfirm relationships is stronger in the Japanese context.  
That is, national culture of Japan moderates the positive 
link between interpersonal dependence and interfirm 
relationships. Numerous accounts of business 
relationships in Japan highlight the importance of 
personal ties (Batzer and Laumer 1989; Gerlag 1992; 
Lincoln and Kallberg 1990; Yoshimura and Anderson 
1996).   Previous studies found that a central theme in 
accounts of Japanese interfirm relationships is the close 
and personal relations between distributor personnel and 
supplier personnel.  Personal, emotional ties are regarded 
not only as more important than abstract legal rules but 
also than a short-term economic advantage.  
 
Between the partners in the distribution chain, these 
personal relationships find expression in regular and 
frequent visits by supplier personnel, generous provision 
of assistance and support (even with private problems), 
frequent exchange of gifts, and a refusal to put pressure 
on distributors to stepping up sales.
3  In Japan where 
interfirm relationships are embedded in personal 
relationships, personal-level dependence is considered as 
essential prerequisites of interfirm relationships (Herbig 
1995). That is, personal-level dependence should  be 
nurtured first to elevate the exchange to the interfirm level 
and develop business relationships, to relieve the fears of 
shirking and opportunism of the exchange partners, which 
makes it easier for a distributor firm to trust the supplier 
and commit to the relationship with the supplier at the 
corporate level (Bradach and Eccles 1989).  
 
Similarly, trustworthiness of the supplier firm and 
commitment to the relationship in Japanese marketing 
channel relationships are very much dependent on the 
extent to which a distributor has developed personal 
dependence on the supplier personnel.  That is, a supplier 
salesrep’s close attention to serving the distributor needs, 
coupled with willingness to go extra miles for the benefit 
of the distributor, and distributor’s personal dependence 
on that salesperson should come first to generate 
trustworthiness of the supplier firm and commitment to 
the relationship with the supplier.  Therefore, we suggest 
that 
 
H6: The positive influence of a distributor’s personal-
level dependence on (a) trustworthiness of the supplier 
firm and (b) distributor commitment, and (c)   
distributor firm-level dependence will be higher for 
Japanese distributors than for U.S. distributors. 
METHOD 
 
Empirical Study Context 
Downstream channel relationships between industrial 
distributors and suppliers were chosen as the empirical 
setting.  Specifically, industrial distributors of two four-
digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes (5084, 
industrial machinery/equipment, and 5085, industrial 
supplies) were examined.  The industry classification 
categories in Japan, which are equivalent to the U.S. SIC 
codes 5084 and 5085, are machinery/instrument and 
industrial supplies/hardware, respectively.  
Measure Development  
Multi-item measures were developed for each 
construct by the following process:  First, measure 
development efforts began with personal interviews with 
industrial distributors and suppliers in Japan. Second, two 
sets of measurement items, one English version and one 
Japanese version, were developed from the results of 
personal interviews and a review of prior academic 
empirical studies and trade publications from the United 
States and Japan. To enhance translation equivalence, the 
English version of the questionnaire was first translated 
into Japanese and then retranslated into English. Third, 
the resulting items were administered to 10 Japanese IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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distributors and marketing consultants through personal 
interviews to determine whether they would assess the 
items as relevant for Japanese business relationships and 
interpret them as was intended.  Fourth, after some minor 
changes, the mail survey was pretested on 120 industrial 
distributors in the United States and 50 industrial 
distributors in Japan. Forty  U.S. distributors and 17 
Japanese distributors responded, which is a comparable 
response rate.  After applying the measure refinement 
process outlined by Churchill (1995), the remaining items 
showed encouraging levels of reliability and 
unidimensionality and were included in the main survey 
(see Appendix).  
 
Cost efficiency.  Coordination cost is defined as the 
cost of communicating and negotiating with the focal 
supplier firm to fulfill business transactions.   
Coordination cost from a distributor perspective is 
examined. Four items (1: Needs very little time and effort 
– 7: Needs very much time and effort)   from Dumond 
(1991) and Richeson, Lackey, and Starner, Jr (1995)   
were used in the survey.  Elements of interfirm 
relationships.  Two major elements of relational exchange 
are examined: trustworthiness of the supplier and 
distributor commitment. For trustworthiness of supplier, 
we focus on the belief aspect of trust and operationalize it 
as a distributor’s belief about the credibility and sincerity of 
its supplier.  Four measurement items from Ganesan’s 
(1994) and Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) work were used.  
Distributor commitment was measured using four items 
from  Anderson and Weitz’s (1992) study, including a 
strong sense of loyalty, willingness to invest in the 
relationship, and treating the relationship as a long-term 
alliance.   
Dependence. Dependence is examined at interfirm 
level and interpersonal level. Dependence at the interfirm 
level is defined as the extent to which a firm needs to 
maintain a channel relationship with its exchange partner 
firm (Frazier 1983). Four items from Heide’s (1994) and 
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp’s (1995) work were used 
to measure distributor firm dependence and supplier firm 
dependence. For both distributor firm dependence and 
supplier firm dependence, we focus on each firm's 
replaceability within the distributor's trade area (Frazier 
and Rody 1991; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).  
For a distributor’s personal dependence, we examine the 
key informant’s dependence on the contact person in the 
supplier firm.  Specifically, we used four items to gauge 
the importance of the contact person and reliance on that 
person for distributor’s business.  The items from Frazier 
(1983), Behrman and Perreault (1982), and Bush et al. 
(1990) were borrowed and adapted for the study context.  
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
The sampling frame for the United States was a Dun 
and Bradstreet mailing list.  A random sample of 1000 
industrial distributors was selected from the list.  The 
sampling frame for Japan was the industrial distribution 
section of Nikkei Annual Corporation Reports (1996).  A 
random sample of 418 distributors was selected from the 
list.  Data collection began with a letter to the chosen 
distributors introducing the research project.  A few days 
later, the first wave of questionnaires was sent with a 
cover letter.  For the mail survey in Japan,  a 
recommendation letter by a marketing professor at a 
highly prestigious university was enclosed to enhance the 
credibility of the study and the response rate.  A follow-
up questionnaire was sent three weeks later to those who 
had not responded to the original questionnaire. A 
postcard reminding those distributors who had not 
responded to the first questionnaire was sent between the 
two waves of questionnaire mailing.    
The final response rate was 28.3% (283 out of 1000 
sent) for the United States and 40.9% (171 out of 418 
sent) for Japan.  After eliminating some of the returned 
questionnaires because of either incomplete information 
or company-specific situations, 253 U.S. responses (116 
responses from SIC code 5084 and 137 from SIC code 
5085) and 140 Japanese responses (73 and 67 from SIC 
codes 5084 and 5085, respectively) were used for 
analysis.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The analysis begins with the calculation of 
descriptive statistics for summed scales.  Pearson 
correlations between each summed scale also were 
calculated and are reported in Table 1. The proposed 
model was estimated by path analysis option of LISREL 8 
and the results are reported on Table 2.  
 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrixes 
      Mean 
U. S.  Japan 
       S.D. 
U.S.  Japan 
  1         2        3        4         5        6                     
 
1. Supplier dependence 
2. Personal dependence 
3.  Distributor dependence 
4. Trustworthiness of supplier 
5.  Distributor commitment 
6.  Coordination cost 
4.31    5.08   
3.26    4.73  
3.76    5.28 
5.36    5.51 
5.35    5.59 
2.71    3.49       
 1.47   1.41 
 1.56   1.23 
 1.52   1.46  
 1.13   1.09 
 1.23     .96 
 1.33   1.31  
 1.00    .20    .31     .42      .44    - 17             
  .12 
a 1.00    .21     .48      .43    - .21     
  .31     .23   1.00    .36      .47     .03     
  .04     .06     .27   1.00      .56   - 49     
  .37     .23     .53     .38    1.00   - .21    
  .26     .22     .03    -.39     -.10   1.00         
a The lower triangular matrix provides the correlations for the U.S. data, and the upper triangular matrix (italicized) indicates the correlations for the Japanese data. 
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Table 2 





                Nonstandardized Coefficient 
          United States                Japan         
H1: Trustworthiness of supplier ˛  Coordination cost 
H2: Distributor commitment ˛ Coordination cost 
H3: Trustworthiness of supplier ˛ Distributor commitment 
H4a: Distributor dependence ˛ Distributor commitment 
H4b: Supplier dependence ˛ Distributor commitment 
H5a: Personal dependence ˛ Trustworthiness of supplier (U.S.) 
H5b: Personal dependence ˛ Distributor commitment (U.S.) 
H5c: Personal dependence ˛ Distributor dependence  (U.S.) 
H6a: Personal dependence ˛ Trustworthiness of supplier (Japan) 
H6b: Personal dependence ˛ Distributor commitment (Japan) 
H6c: Personal dependence ˛ Distributor dependence  (Japan) 
     (-) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
     (+) 
    (++) 
    (++) 
    (++) 
           -.53  (-6.55)
c              -.68 (-6.77)
c  
            .06  (  .75)                  .19 (1.48)
a 
            .30  (5.16)
c                 .25 (3.81)
c 
            .35  (7.83)
c                 .19 (4.39)
c 
            .17  (3.84)
c                 .12 (2.80)
c 
            .03  ( .69)                     
   
            .07  (1.66)
b  
            .23  (3.41)
c              
  
                                              .42 (5.63)
c 
                                              .12 (2.01)
b   
                                              .32 (2.89)
c  
a: p < .10; 
b: p < .05; 
c: p < .01. 
 
  Interfirm relationships and efficiency of exchange. 
Coordination cost is associated negatively with  the 
trustworthiness of supplier both in the United States (b = -
.53, p < .01) and Japan (b = -.68,  p < .01). Thus, H1 is 
fully supported.  Coordination cost is associated 
positively with distributor commitment in Japan (b = .19, 
p < .10), but not in the United States (b = .06, n.s.).   
Therefore, H2 is partially supported.     
 
Relationships among interfirm-level exchange 
elements.  Table 3 shows that trustworthiness of supplier  
is associated positively with distributor commitment in 
both the United States (b = .30, p < .01) and Japan (b = 
.25, p < .01), in support of H3.  Similarly, distributor 
commitment is associated positively with distributor 
dependence (b = .35, p < .01 in the United States; b = .19, 
p < .01 in Japan) and supplier dependence (b = .17, p < 
.01 in the United States; b = .12, p < .01 in Japan). 
Therefore, H4a and H4b are fully supported. 
 
Personal dependence and interfirm relationships.  In 
the United States, personal dependence is related 
positively to distributor dependence (b = .23, p < .01) and 
distributor commitment (b = .07, p < .05), although it is 
unrelated to trustworthiness of supplier (b = .03, n.s.). 
Thus,  H5 is partially supported. In contrast, personal 
dependence in Japan is associated positively with   
trustworthiness of supplier (b = .42, p < .01), distributor 
commitment (b = .12, p < .05), and  distributor 
dependence (b = .32, p < .01), as we hypothesized.   The 
beta coefficients of the United States and Japan were 
compared by Z scores to test H6.  The Z scores are 4.32 
(p < .01) for trustworthiness of supplier, .68 (n.s.) for 
distributor commitment, and .75 (n.s.) for distributor 
dependence. Therefore,  the difference between the 
United States and Japan is significant  only for the link 
between personal dependence and trustworthiness of 






Interpersonal dependence and interfirm 
relationships. The effect of personal dependence on 
interfirm relationships shows both cross-national 
convergence and divergence.  In both countries, personal 
dependence is related positively to distributor firm-level 
dependence and distributor commitment. In contrast, 
personal-level dependence is unrelated to trustworthiness 
of the supplier firm in the United States, whereas it is 
related significantly to trustworthiness of supplier firm in 
Japan. Interfirm relationships in Japan are clearly 
inalienable (Franzen and Davis 1990) – interpersonal ties 
are significantly intertwined with interfirm relationships.   
 
The analysis results also corroborate the relevance of 
embeddedness concept (Granovetter 1985) to 
accommodate the impact of social relations on interfirm 
exchanges. That is, the results indicate that neither 
economic perspective nor sociological perspective explain 
the effect of personal dependence on interfirm 
relationships adequately.  Specifically, in the United 
States, where personal dependence is often considered 
independent of interfirm relational factors, it turned out to 
be related significantly to a distributor’s firm-level 
dependence and commitment.  For sociological 
perspective, none of the factors in the model seem to be 
institutionalized in the United States either.  In Japan, 
economic perspective is clearly out of sync with the 
reality because interpersonal dependence is highly related 
to all three interfirm relational elements.  Similarly, none 
of the factors in the model, including personal 
dependence, appear to be institutionalized in Japan 
because each construct shows substantial variation.  In 
sum, it is really the extent of embeddedness - details of 
interpersonal ties in individual interfirm relationships -  
that shape interfirm relationships (Granovetter 1985).     
 
Interfirm relationships and economic efficiency. 
Despite great interest in relational approach of interfirm 
exchange in the last decade, the effect of relationship 
marketing on economic performance remains ambiguous IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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(cf. Kalwani and Narayandas 1995; Noordewier, John, 
and Nevin 1990).  The analysis results indicate that the 
elements of relationship marketing has differential effects 
on the economic performance, thereby suggesting the 
danger of making a sweeping prediction on the effect of 
relationship marketing on economic performance.   
Instead, at least for coordination cost considerations, it is 
necessary to specify distinctive elements of relationship 
marketing and examine the link between each element 
and economic performance separately.  For example, 
consider industrial distributor – supplier relationships in 
Japan.  The results suggest that trustworthiness of supplier 
lowers coordination cost significantly, whereas distributor 
commitment increases coordination cost.  Collapsing 
supplier trustworthiness and distributor commitment 
together will simply blur differential effect of each 




Interpersonal dependence and interfirm 
relationships.  What drives a distributor’s trust toward its 
supplier and commitment to the relationship with that 
supplier?  Pervious studies in the United States identified 
various firm-level drivers of trust and commitment, and 
the analysis results shows that it is indeed the firm-level 
drivers such as distributor dependence and supplier firm 
trustworthiness that drive interfirm relationships. But, the 
analysis results also show that personal dependence 
increase distributor dependence and commitment.  For the 
Japanese distributors, the analysis results suggest that 
personal dependence has to be developed and nurtured 
first to develop and practice relationship marketing in 
Japan. In Japan, interpersonal factors are found to 
contribute to the reduction of coordination cost indirectly 
through  trustworthiness of the supplier.    
 
Differential effects of  trustworthiness of supplier and 
distributor commitment.  The results from both the United 
States and Japan suggest that trustworthiness of supplier 
lowers a distributor’s coordination cost with its focal 
supplier.  In contrast, distributor commitment, a concept 
that has been highlighted as a key element of relationship 
marketing (Morgan and Hunt 1994), is found to have 
either no effect (United States sample) or increase (Japan 
sample)  a distributor’s coordination cost.  Three 
implications emerge from these cross-national similarities 
and differences. First, the analysis results clearly show 
that trustworthiness of supplier and distributor 
commitment is two distinct issues, although they are 
related to each other. Different effects of  trustworthiness 
of supplier and distributor commitment on coordination 
cost as well as different antecedents of  trustworthiness of 
supplier and distributor commitment suggest that 
distributors consider them as separate issues. For a 
distributor’s commitment to the relationship, 
interdependence issues are as important as trustworthiness 
of the focal supplier.  
 
Second, as least for the coordination cost, distributor 
commitment does not help a distributor realize lower 
coordination cost. This result suggests the need for a 
distributor to be selective in developing and maintaining 
highly committed relationships with its suppliers. 
Juxtaposing this result with Japanese business practice 
brings forth an intriguing insight on Japanese marketing 
channel relationships.  The positive link between 
distributor commitment and coordination cost at least 
partly explain why channel relationships in Japan tend to 
be more selective than those of the United States. One 
reason is the higher coordination cost of Japanese 
distributors (median = 3.50) than U.S. distributors 
(median = 2.50) and the positive effect of distributor 
commitment on coordination cost.  Third, unlike 
distributor commitment, trustworthiness of the focal 
supplier lower coordination cost significantly in both the 
United States and Japan.  This cross-national convergence 
indicates two things. First, although trust has mainly been 
considered as an attitudinal variable whose impact on 
economic performance is dubious, the results show 
clearly that trust helps a distributor reduce coordination 
cost, thereby saving total transaction cost.  Second, this 
convergence indicates that building trust, at least at the 
interfirm level, works for foreign channel relationships as 
well as for domestic channel relationships. It alleviates 
the burden of adaptation in foreign markets, but channel 
managers need to pay extra attention on gaining trust of 
channel members in both domestic and foreign marketing 
channels.      
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
The study has two major limitations. First, the study 
examined only a part of total transaction cost in interfirm 
exchanges. Although we believe that coordination cost is 
the key element of transaction cost in ongoing channel 
relationships, transaction cost involves not just 
coordination cost, but other types of cost such as 
acquisition cost (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). It is 
also possible that relational exchange elements have 
different links with other transaction cost elements. 
Therefore, future research needs to specify relevant cost 
elements for the focal channel context and examine the 
effect of relational exchange elements on each cost 
element. 
 
Although we believe that personal dependence is the 
key element of interpersonal ties, it is possible that 
interpersonal ties have other elements such as personal-
level trust (Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993) or 
investment (Rusbult 1980). It is necessary for future 
studies to specify the domain of interpersonal ties and 
clarify relationships among these elements. Subsequently, IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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the relevant elements of interpersonal ties should be 
examined in conjunction with interfirm exchange 





1. Japan was chosen as a country of comparison because 
(a) cross-cultural divergence is likely to be revealed more 
readily when domestic channel relationships are 
contrasted with those of Japan where personal 
relationships are known to play a crucial role for the 
success of interfirm relationships (Batzer and Laumer 
1989; Nevin 1995), (b) Japan is the second largest trading 
partner of the United States and its distribution channel 
has been suggested as one of the major barriers of market 
access by the U. S. firms (Fahy and Taguchi 1995), and 
(c) very few empirical studies on the role of personal 
relationships in Japan has been reported despite its alleged 
importance in managing Japanese channel relationships 
(see Money 1996 for an exception). 
 
2. Interestingly, both under-socialized and over-socialized 
views on economic exchange have in common a 
conception of exchange carried out by atomized actors.  
In the undersocialized account, atomization results from 
narrow utilitarian pursuit of self-interest; in the 
oversocialized one, behavioral patterns have been 
internalized and ongoing social relations thus have only 
peripheral effects on behavior.  
 
3. Note that this statement does not mean that Japanese 
firms rely solely on personal relationship for business 
dealings.  On the contrary,  the business ties between 
manufacturer and distributor in Japan reflects business 
interdependence, but they are also a function of personal 
relationships (Czinkota and Woronoff 1986). 
4. The test of results of  validity check, nonresponse bias 
check, key informant bias check, and measurement 
invariance check are omitted from the text because of 
space limitations,  but they are available from the author 





Measurement Items Used for the Empirical Study* 
 
Distributor commitment (LISREL-based composite 
reliabilities = .88 for the United States and .86 for Japan) 
How would you characterize your firm's commitment to the 
business relationship with the supplier firm?  
 
  1. Treating the relationship as a long-term alliance.               
  2.  Committed  to  the  business  relationship.         
  3. Having a strong sense of loyalty to the partner firm.                
  4. Willing to make long-term investments for the partner 
firm.              
 
Trustworthiness of the supplier (LISREL-based composite 
reliabilities = .88 for the United States and .87 for Japan) 
  1. We can count on this supplier to be sincere. 
  2. This supplier follows through on its promises. 
  3. I can expect this supplier to tell me the truth. 
      4. I believe this supplier is fair in doing business with 
us. 
 
Distributor dependence (LISREL-based composite 
reliabilities = .81 for the United States and .75 for Japan) 
1. Our total cost of switching to a competing supplier's line 
would be prohibitive. 
2. There are other suppliers that could provide us with 
comparable product lines. 
a, b 
3. It would be difficult for us to replace the sales and profits 
generated from this supplier’s line. 
4. My firm would suffer greatly if we lost this supplier. 
 
Supplier dependence (LISREL-based composite 
reliabilities = .75 for the United States and .71 for Japan) 
1. It would be difficult for this supplier to replace the sales 
and profits our distributorship generates. 
2. In our trading area, there are other firms that could 
provide this supplier with comparable distribution .
a, b 
3. This supplier would suffer greatly in our trading area if it 
lost our distributorship. 
 4. In our trading area, this supplier would incur minimal 
costs in replacing our firm with another distributor. 
a  
 
Personal dependence (LISREL-based composite 
reliabilities = .88 for the United States and .88 for Japan) 
1. The support of this supplier’s sales rep is crucial to our 
ability to sell this product line. 
2. We are dependent on this rep for our business with this 
supplier. 
3. We are relying on this rep’s expertise for the sales of this 
product. 
4. This supplier sales rep is important to our business. 
 
Coordination cost (LISREL-based composite reliabilities = 
.87 for the United States and .84 for Japan) 
(needs very little time and effort – needs very much time 
and effort) 
  
1. Revising and modifying the terms of prior business 
agreements with this supplier. 
2. Resolving differences between what this supplier wants 
and what my firm wants. 
3. Reaching agreement with this supplier on business 
negotiation issues. 
4. Communicating with this supplier (telephone calls, 
meeting, etc.)      
_______________________________________________
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* All measurement items are anchored as Likert- type 
scales, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(7) , unless denoted otherwise. 
a Denotes reverse-scaled items. 
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